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INTRODUCTION

As a sacred symbol of electoral equality and democracy, the Voting
Rights Act (VRA)1 has long been regarded as "the most effective civil
rights statute" ever promulgated by Congress.2 Section 5 of the VRA
("Section 5") has been called the "crown jewel" of the Act, 3 uniquely targeting only certain jurisdictions-eight states and various other counties
and townships4-with some of the country's worst histories of voting discrimination, and requiring that these jurisdictions submit any electionrelated changes for approval by the federal government.5

I Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (current version
at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb).
2 Richard H. Pildes, Introduction to THE FUTURE OF THE VOTiNG RIGHTS AcT, at xi,
xi
(David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006).
Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Louis Fuentes-Rohwer, Rethinking Section 5, in THE FUTURE
OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 2, at 38, 38.
States covered in whole are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
South Carolina, and Texas; Virginia, with the exception of fourteen political subdivisions, is
also covered. Townships in Michigan and New Hampshire, as well as counties in California,
Florida, New York, North Carolina and South Dakota are also covered. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
voting/sec_..5/covered.htm#notel (last visited Oct. 23, 2007).
' Before Section 5 was reauthorized, it required that covered jurisdictions submit "any
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964" to either the Attorney General for preclearance approval, or to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2000), amended by Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks,
and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act (VRARA)
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006) (to be codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973-1973bb-1). The proposed voting change must not have had "the purpose [or] ...
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.... [and] no
person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply" with the proposed change.
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In Georgia v. Ashcrof, 6 however, the Supreme Court adopted a more
deferential approach that may well have robbed Section 5 of its enforcement power regarding legislative redistricting.7 In response, many civil
rights scholars and advocates urged Congress both to reauthorize and to
strengthen the provision before it was due to expire in 2007.8 Congress
allayed such fears on July 13, 2006 by passing the Fannie Lou Hamer,
Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006 (VRARA).9 Congress not only reauthorized Section 5 for another twenty-five years with the near-unanimous
support of both houses,' ° but it also explicitly condemned Georgia v.
Ashcroft for misconstruing Section 5."
Nonetheless, civil rights advocates and proponents of Section 5 may
still have reason to worry. After the VRARA bill passed and only one day
before President Bush signed the bill into law, the Senate Judiciary
Committee issued a report (the Senate Judiciary Committee Report or
Senate Report) 2 on the virtually identical Senate version of the bill.'"
The Senate Report interpreted the language of the reauthorized Section
5 narrowly, while two individual Republican senators argued that the legislative process was too time-pressured and politically charged to enable

6

539 U.S. 461 (2003).

7 See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (criticizing Ashcrfs retrogression stan-

dard for weakening Section 5's enforcement powers with respect to redistricting); see also
Bernard Grofman & Thomas Brunell, ExtendingSection 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Complex
InteractionBetween Law and Politics, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 2,
at 311, 315 (condemning Ashcroft for robbing Section 5 of its central justification and enforcement powers).
8 See, e.g., LAUGHLIN McDONALD & DANIEL LEvITAs, ACLU VOTING RIGHTS PROJECT,
THE CASE FOR EXTENDING AND AMENDING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, VOTING RIGHTS

LITIGATION, 1982-2006: A REPORT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN CIvIL
LIBERTIES UNION (2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/votingrights/2005-report.pdf
(urging Congress to renew and strengthen Section 5 based on detailed descriptions of post1982 Section 5 litigation).
9 Pub L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577.
10 See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (describing the bill's passage by the entire Senate and all but thirty-three members of the House).
I See Pub L. No. 109-246, § 2(b)(6) ("The effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 has been significantly weakened by the United States Supreme Court decisions in
Reno v. Bossier Parish II and Georgia v. Ashcroft, which have misconstrued Congress' original intent in enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and narrowed the protections afforded
by Section 5 of such Act.")
12 S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 1 (2006) (Conf. Rep.).
13 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King, and Cksar E. Chfvez Voting
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, S. 2703, 109th Cong. (2d Sess.
2006). The only difference between the bills is that the Senate version included CUsar E.
Chdvez's name in its tide.
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Congress to craft an adequate Section 5.14 The Senate Report cannot be
said to represent the views of the entire committee, however. Not only
did one Republican Senate Judiciary Committee member refuse to sign
the Report, 15 but the Democratic members of the Judiciary Committee
never received a version of the final Report containing the narrow inter16
Ultipretation of Section 5 retrogression before the Report was filed.
mately, the published Senate Report included a fervent dissent to an earlier version of the Report. This dissent, signed by all eight Democratic
Senators on the Senate Judiciary Committee, denounced the Senate Report as inaccurate, postenactment
legislative history not deserving ofju17
dicial consideration.
Still, given that there is considerable debate among scholars as to
which retrogression standard 8 the reauthorized Section 5 established,
and that the text of the legislation, the floor debates, and the House
Committee Report 19 fail to provide any further guidance or alternate understanding, this appended Committee Report may become pivotal in
cases challenging the reauthorized Section 5's constitutionality."' If the
Court adopts the Senate Report's narrow interpretation, Section 5's preclearance enforcement provision 2' is more likely to be held unconstitutional, which is exactly the result that civil rights advocates and many
supporters of the bill aimed to avoid.22
14
15

See infta Part I.D (describing the Senate Judiciary Committee report).
See Seth Stem, Senate Democrats Suggest Republicans Tried To Undercut Voting Rights Act,

CQTODAY, July 27, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 13284338 (noting Senator DeWine's refusal to sign the SenateJudiciary Committee report).
16 See 152 CONG. REc. S8372-73 (daily ed. July 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (accusing the Republican Senate Judiciary Committee members of failing to provide Democratic members with copies of the Senate Report before filing it).
17 S. REP. No. 109-295,
at 54-55.
18 In this piece, "retrogression standard" refers to
the degree to which Section 5
dilutes the impact of minorities' votes.
19 H.R. REP. NO. 109-478 (2006)
(Conf. Rep.).
20 See, e.g., Complaint at 1-8, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist.
No. One v. Gonzales, No.
06-01384 (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2006), available at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/
northwest%20austin.pdf. Other documents relating to the case are available on the
Public Citizen's website.
See Public Citizen, http://www.citizen.org/litigation/
forms/cases/CaseDetails.cfm?cID=361 (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
21 In this piece, the "preclearance enforcement provision" means
that a covered
jurisdiction's proposed voting-related change will only be permitted if it meets Section
5's retrogression standard.
22 See Letter from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to Hon. F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 3, 2006), available at
http://www.votingrights.org/advocacy/downloads/LCCR%20VRA%2OSign%200n%20Le
tter.pdf (urging Congress to reauthorize section 5 and restore it to "its original Congressional intent," and to keep "the federal observer provisions in place").
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This Comment will examine whether the Senate Judiciary Committee
Report should be considered legislative history relevant to interpreting Section 5's scope and evaluating the provision's constitutionality. Part I will
provide a historical and legislative background of Section 5 of the VRA before and after its reauthorization in 2006, and will describe in detail the
appended Senate Judiciary Committee's Report. Part II will then examine
which retrogression standard the reauthorized Section 5 established in the
absence of the Senate Report, as compared with the narrow standard articulated by the Report Such an analysis highlights how critical the Senate
Report, if considered authoritative legislative history, could be in determining the scope and enforcement power of Section 5. Part I will consider
which type of legislative history, if any, the Senate Report should constitute,
and, thus, what level of deference it is owed by thejudiciary. After all, each
type of legislative history the Report might constitute, be it a committee report or postenactment legislative history, would entitle the report to a different level of authoritativeness. Because the Senate Report does not concretely fall into either of these categories, Part IV will then evaluate whether
the Report represents Congress's collective understanding of Section 5,
employing three models that consider, respectively, whether the bill's sponsor, the median voter, or the bill's explicit language best represents congressional intent. Under each of these models, the Report fails to represent congressional intent accurately, leading to the conclusion that the
Senate Judiciary Committee Report should not factor into judicial decision
making. Instead, the Report raises the same bootstrapping concern as postenactment legislation, which the Court has repeatedly refused to consider
as relevant legislative history.
I. BACKGROUND ON SECTION 5'S EVOLUTION: SECTION 5 BOTH
BEFORE AND AFTER THE

2006

REAUTHORIZATION, AND

THE SENATEJUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT

A. Section 5 and the Beer RetrogressionStandard
By requiring each covered jurisdiction to have its election laws "precleared" by federal officials orjudges, Section 5 of the VRA empowers the
federal government to prevent covered jurisdictions from enacting discriminatory voting standards, procedures, and practices. Although the
original VRA already designated when ajurisdiction should be entitled to
a24
preclearance,2 3 the Supreme Court in Beer v. United States
narrowed Sec23 See supranote 5 (explaining the original VRA's preclearance standard).

24 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
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tion 5's enforcement powers by establishing what has come to be known
as a "non-retrogression" standard, which prevents covered jurisdictions
from weakening
minorities' existing electoral position and voting
25
power. Beer established that Section 5 preclearance relies solely on the
discriminatory effects of voting-related changes, ignoring intent. To
evaluate effects on minority voting strength, courts engaging in Beer Section 5 analysis have generally compared the number of majority-minority
districts-districts in which a single minority group makes up more than
fifty percent of the voting age population-before and after the proposed
voting or districting change. 6
However, this method may not be the best way of advancing the
VRA's underlying purpose and evaluating minority voting strength. In
fact, there is significant debate among election law scholars as to whether
minorities' electoral interests are best served by majority-minority districts. Proponents of majority-minority districts argue that, both empirically and from a policy standpoint, these districts constitute a better safeguard against minority vote dilution than "influence" or "coalition"
districts. 2 7 Influence districts are defined by the Supreme Court as ones
in which minority voters, who constitute as little as twenty-five percent of
the overall population, "may not be able to elect a candidate of choice
28
but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral process."
Meanwhile, the Ashcroft Court defined "coalition" districts as "communities in which minority citizens are able to form coalitions with voters from
other racial and ethnic groups, having no need to be a majority within a

25

Id. at 141.

6 See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme
Court's

Section 5 retrogression cases generally involved majority-minority districts).
27 See Bernard Grofman et al., DrawingEffective Minority Districts: A ConceptualFramework
and Some Empirical Evidence 79 N.C. L. REV. 1383, 1404-05 (2001) (offering empirical evidence that black voters benefit more from majority-minority districts than minority influence districts); Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3
ELECTION L.J. 21, 35 (2004) (arguing that majority-minority districts are a better safeguard
against minority vote dilution than influence districts).
28 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003). In practice,
minorities in such a district should constitute a significant enough share of the district that they will not be ignored
by the eventually elected representative, whether or not the minorities themselves voted for
that candidate. Nathaniel Persily, Die Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 159, on file with author). However, both the
House and Senate Reports criticized the "influence district" standard as amorphous and
unworkable. See H.R- REP. No. 109-478, at 69 (2006) (Conf. Rep.) (criticizing this standard
for allowing state legislators to strike political deals "purporting to give 'influence' to the
minority community while removing that community's ability to elect candidates"); S. REP.
No. 109-295, at 18 (2006) (Conf. Rep.) (finding the "influence" district concept to be
"vague").
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single district in order to elect candidates of their choice." 29 In contrast,
other scholars argue that "packing" minorities into a few districts actually
dilutes minorities' electoral influence, while dispersing minorities into
"influence" or "coalition" districts increases their ability to elect their
candidates of choice due to coalitions they build with white voters.3°
B. Pre-Reauthorization:Adoption of the DeferentialAshcroft Standard
Confronting doubts as to the viability of using majority-minority districts to measure minority voting strength, in 2003 the Supreme Court
modified the Beer retrogression standard in Georgia v. Ashcroft.
Supported by many prominent African-American Democratic legislators and
admittedly aimed at increasing the number of Democratic Senate seats,
the redistricting plan involved in Ashcroft, which the Georgia State Senate
had adopted after the 2000 census, dispersed minorities from majorityminority districts into a greater number of districts where they constituted as little as a quarter of the district population.32 Opposing Georgia's request for a declaratory judgment that this plan would not violate
Section 5, the Attorney General argued that because the plan unlawfully
reduced minorities' ability to elect their candidates of choice, it should
not be precleared.33 Although Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for
the majority, conceded that minority voters under the redistricting plan
"will face a somewhat reduced opportunity to elect their candidate of
choice,"34 she upheld the redistricting scheme under a broad "totality of
the circumstances" test as "likely" meeting the state's non-retrogression

29 539 U.S. at 481 (quotingJohnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020
(1994)). More
specifically, a "coalition" district is one in which "minorities constitute under 50% of the
district, but with likely white crossover voting, they will be able to elect their preferred candidate." Persily, supra note 28 (manuscript at 160). As with "influence" districts, the Senate
Report disapproves of "coalition" districts as being "too difficult to define." S. REP. No. 109295, at 18.
See,

e.g.,
CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION
OF
AFRICAN AMERICANS INCONGRESS 210-11 (1993) (preferring minority influence districts for
enabling minority politicians to garner more support through interracial coalitions);
Charles Cameron et al., Do Majority-MinorityDistricts Maximize Substantive Black Representation
in Congress?,90 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 794 (1996) (arguing that minority influence districts better position minority politicians for political success); Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law
Now at War with Itsef?. Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L.REV. 1517, 153940 (2002) (arguing that especially because voting is decreasingly racially polarized, coalition
districts enhance minority electoral success).
31 539 U.S. at 480.
32 Id. at 469-71.
33 Id. at 472.
34 Id. at
489-90.
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burden.3" Reasoning that voting scholars themselves cannot agree on
whether minorities can still effectively exert their electoral strength in socalled influence districts, the Court in Ashcroft granted local officials significant discretion in deciding whether to concentrate minorities in a
smaller number of majority-minority districts or to reapportion them into
a greater number of "influence" districts. 6 Moreover, since minority political influence is not limited to winning elections, Ashcrofl argued that
"influence districts" can still enable minority groups who do not constitute a majority of voters in a given district to affect the political process. 37
Not surprisingly, the same scholars favoring minority influence and
coalition districts over majority-minority districts heralded Ashcroft for
permitting "democratic experimentalism."38
Under this approach,
Ashcroft appears to offer an appropriately flexible standard that takes into
account redistricting plans' nuanced "trade-offs of political influence versus descriptive representation. 39 However, other scholars vehemently
criticized Ashcroft for undermining the VRA's original intent of placing
the burden on covered jurisdictions, rather than on the federal government or plaintiffs challenging the proposed changes, to prove that the
voting changes do not retrogress to harm minority voters. 4° Seen in this
light, Ashcrofl considerably "defang[ed]" and rendered pointless Section
5's redistricting enforcement powers. 41 Moreover, critics see the Ashcroft
standard, in failing both to articulate what constitutes a legally sufficient
"influence district" and to provide an algorithm for measuring retrogression, as beingjudicially unmanageable, thus "leav[ing] open the possibility that an amorphous standard
will succumb to the partisan whims of
42
those who will enforce it."

35
36

Id. at 487.
Id. at 487-90.

Id. at 480.
Richard H. Pildes, Political Competition and the Modern VRA, in THE FUTURE OF THE
VOTING RiGHTS ACr, supranote 2, at 1, 8.
39 Samuel Issacharoff, Does Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Still Work?, in THE FUTURE OF
37
38

THE VOTING RGHTSACr, supra note 2, at 107, 114.
40 See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, Options and Strategies
for Renewal of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 2, at 223, 228 (arguing
that the Ashcrofl standard rendered preclearance procedures "pointless"); Karlan, supra note
27, at 21 (criticizing Ashcrof for "fundamentally alter[ing]" Section 5 preclearance).
41 Persily, supra note 40, at 235.
42 Id. at 128; see also 77e ContinuingNeed for Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearingon S. 2703
Before the S. Comm. on theJudiciary,109th Cong. 8 (2006) [hereinafter PreclearanceSenate Hearings] (statement of Theodore S. Arrington, Professor of Political Science, University of
North Carolina) (criticizing Ashcrofl for misapprehending minority voter interests especially
in light of continued racial bloc voting); id. at 6-8 (statement of Ronald Keith Gaddie, Pro-
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C. 2006 Reauthorization: OverturningAshcroft and
Attempting To Return to Beer Retrogression

On July 19, 2006, Congress reauthorized Section 5 for twenty-five
more years with the support of a unanimous Senate 43 and all but thirtythree members of the House. 44 Many civil rights advocates declared the
reauthorization process a resounding success, not only for preventing
Section 5 from expiring in 2007, but also for explicitly overruling the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcrof. 4 ' Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, who led the passage of the initial bill, described Congress's process of reauthorizing the
VRA as "one of the most extensive considerations of any piece
of legisla46
•
tion" that he had seen in over twenty-seven years as a legislator.
The House passed the reauthorization bill without amendment, ultimately rejecting all four proposed amendments.
Although the reauthorization bill met with little resistance from senators on the floor or
through amendment, several experts testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee criticized Section 5. These experts expressed concern
that Section 5 of the VRA might not survive constitutional scrutiny under
the Supreme Court's "congruent and proportional" standard for legislafessor of Political Science, University of Oklahoma) (faulting both the pre-Ashcrof majorityminority standard and the Ashcroft standard for being unworkable).
43 See 152 CONG. REc. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006). Note
that two senators did not
vote. See id.
44 See 152 CONG. REc. H5207 (daily ed. July 13,
2006). Note that nine representatives
did not vote. See id.
45 See Letter from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to Hon.
F. James Sensenbrenner, supra note 22, at 2-4 (listing nearly one hundred civil rights organizations that support the Voting Rights Act).
46 152 CONG. REc. H5143 (statement of F. James
Sensenbrenner, Chairman, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
47 The House considered but defeated four different
amendments: Representative
Norwood's amendment to update the coverage formula based on voter turnout in recent
presidential elections; Representative Gohmert's amendment to reduce the VRA's sunset
period to ten years, rather than twenty-five; Representative King's amendment to repeal
Section 203's multilingual assistance provisions; and Representative Westmoreland's
amendment to change the bail out provision to proactively enable covered jurisdictions to
bailout from coverage. See 152 CONG. REc. D771 (daily ed. July 13, 2006) (summarizing
each amendment and its final roll call vote).
48 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
Multiple statutes have been
struck down under the Boerne standard. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (striking down Tite I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act as applied to the states); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking
down the Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92
(2000) (striking down the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 as applied to the
states); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-
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tion passed pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.49 In
particular, they criticized VRA Section 5 as outdated for employing the
same coverage formula as the original ....
1965 VRA,50 thereby ignoring subsequent improvements in covered jurisdictions.
Moreover, some experts were concerned that the bill's language was too ambiguous, falling
short of defining what it means to "diminish[] the ability of [a minority
group] ... to elect their preferred candidates of choice",5' and thus failing to articulate clearly how jurisdictions can 52establish sufficient nonretrogression warranting Section 5 preclearance.
Despite these objections, the Senate unanimously passed the reauthorization bill without clarifying what either "ability to elect" or retrogression entails. Although scholars and Congress itself widely interpret
the reauthorized Section 5 to constitute a return to the Beer retrogression

48 (1999) (striking down the Patent Remedy Act as applied to the states); Boerne, 521 U.S. at
536 (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
49 See, e.g., An Introduction to the ExpiringProvisions of the Voting Rights Act and
Legal Issues
Relatingto Reauthorization: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on theJudiciay,109th Cong. 214-19 (2d
Sess. 2006) [hereinafter ReauthorizationHearing] (statement of Richard L. Hasen, Professor,
Loyola Law School) (explaining that the bill is vulnerable to several constitutional difficulties and offering suggestions to strengthen it); id. at 220-25 (statement of Samuel Issacharoff, Professor, New York University School of Law) (arguing that the bill could survive
constitutional scrutiny if it employed a different enforcement mechanism); PredearanceSenate Hearings, supra note 42, at 198-207 (statement of Richard H. Pildes, Professor, New York
University School of Law) (supporting the Ashcrofi standard over that of the VRARA bill as
the most appropriate standard to deal with contemporary voting rights problems).
50 See ReauthorizationHearing,supranote 49, at 216 (statement of Richard L. Hasen,
Professor, Loyola Law School) (explaining that Congress would be hard pressed to find the
same type of voting rights violations today as those committed by covered jurisdictions when
the VRA was first enacted); Understandingthe Benefits and Costs ofSection 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing on S. 2703 Before the S. Com. on theJudiciary,109th Cong. 7-9 (2d Sess. 2006) [hereinafter
Benefits and Costs Hearing] (statement of Abigail Themstrom, Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute and Vice-Chair, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights) (criticizing the legislation as offensively stereotyping blacks while simultaneously employing an outdated coverage formula
that ignores the progress that covered jurisdictions have made in recent years). Responding to such concerns, Representatives Norwood and Westmoreland introduced amendments later rejected by Congress that proposed to replace, respectively, Section 5's coverage
formula and bailout provisions. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-554, at 3-4 (2006) (setting forth each
of the amendments, which failed, respectively, by votes of 318 to 96 and 302 to 118, see 152
CONG. REc. H5204-07 (daily ed. July 13, 2006)).
51 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub L. No. 109-246, § 5(b), 120 Stat. 577, 580-81 (2006),
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000)).
52 See, e.g., PreclearanceSenate Hearings,supra note 42, at 11-12 (statement of
Richard H.
Pildes, Professor, New York University School of Law) (explaining that Ashcrof replaced Beer
with a more flexible retrogression standard that is more appropriate to modem voting
rights difficulties).
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standard, 5 there is still considerable debate and confusion over what
standard Section 5 established. 54 Because the Supreme Court often looks
to legislative history that it considers relevant and authoritative in order
to derive congressional intent where statutes are facially ambiguous, 5 the
reauthorized Section 5's imprecise language may open the door for the
Court to consider the Senate Judiciary Committee's controversial, afterthe-fact report.
D. Appended Post-PassageSenateJudiciary Committee Report:
An Attempt To Narrow Section 5's Applicability
On July 26, 2006, after Congress overwhelmingly passed the House
version of the reauthorization bill and one day before President George
W. Bush signed the bill into law, the Senate Judiciary Committee, led by
Committee Chair and official Senate sponsor of the bill Senator Arlen
Specter, issued a report on the virtually identical Senate version of the
bill. The report introduced possibly significant legislative interpretations,
which ultimately may affect Section 5's scope and strength.
In the section explaining Section 5's retrogression standard, the Senate Report defines the provision as protecting only "[n] aturally occurring
majority-minority districts" that "have long been the historical focus of
the Voting Rights Act. '56 Senator Jon Kyl then reiterated this interpretation of Section 5 in his separate "Additional Views.,5 7 Although this definition is somewhat ambiguous, it appears to narrowly construe minorities' "ability to elect." If the courts adopt this understanding of Section 5,
they could
significantly weaken the federal government's enforcement
58
abilities.
In a separate "Additional Views" section, Republican Senators John
Cornyn and Tom Coburn argued that Congress failed to engage in "the
kind of thorough debate that would have produced a superior product"
because of an "unnecessarily heightened political environment" and the
"expedited nature of the process." 59 They pointed to multiple areas of
53 See H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 94 (2006) (Conf.
Rep.) (explaining that the VRARA
"restores the standard articulated in Beer").
54 For an in-depth interpretation of Section 5 that details the political
pressures underlying the 2006 Reauthorization, see Persily, supra note 28.
55 See infra note 105 (explaining which sources are generally considered
relevant legislative history).
56 S. REP. No. 109-295, at 21 (2006) (Conf.
Rep.).
57

Id. at 22, 24.

58

See infta Part II.A-B.
S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 31.

59
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Congress's factual record and testimony before the Senate suggesting
that the reauthorized Section 5 is outdated, overly broad, and constitutionally suspect.60
Although courts interpreting ambiguously worded legislation generally accord significant weight to committee reports,6' several distinguishing factors may decrease the weight that the Senate Report commands.
First, only the Republican members of the Committee signed on to the
Report. In fact, Senator Patrick J. Leahy, ranking minority leader of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, criticized the Republican senators for filing
the final Senate Report before providing any copies to the Democratic
members of the Committee. 62 Nonetheless, the Report itself included
the vehement objections of all eight Democratic Senate Judiciary Committee members63 to a previous version of the bill that failed to include
the narrowing "naturally occurring majority-minority district" language.
In this section, the Democratic members concluded that the report cannot "diminish the force" of Congress's findings or the reauthorized Section 5.64 These Democratic senators, as self-identified "sponsors of the
Senate legislation," argued that the Report became "a very different
document than the draft Report circulated by the Chairman," which
"does not reflect [their] views or those of scores of other cosponsors,"
and departs from the "findings based on the extensive record created in
both the House and Senate... found in the text of the legislation itself."65 By denying that Section 5 applies only to "naturally occurring majority-minority districts," the Democratic members implied that the provision continues to concern and affect all covered jurisdictions. Such a
partisan divide gives rise to two dueling understandings of Congress's intended definition of a minority group's "ability to elect," which in turn

60
61

See id. at 25-53.

See infra notes 114-119 and accompanying text (explaining why committee reports

are accorded more weight than other forms of legislative history).
62 See 152 CONG. REc. S8372 (daily ed.July 27, 2006)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) ("[N]o
draft committee report... was circulated to the committee until July 24, 2006, [five] days
after the Judiciary Committee unanimously voted to report it and the chairman had reported it, and four days after the Senate unanimously passed H.R. 9, the bill that President
Bush signed into law this morning."); see alsoStern, supranote 15 ("Democrats and advocacy
group lawyers say Republicans might be trying to provide after-the-fact help to legal challenges against those provisions by including in the legislative history language that supports
their position.").
63 These members were Senators PatrickJ. Leahy, Edward M. Kennedy, Joseph R Biden, Jr., Herbert Kohl, Dianne Feinstein, Russell D. Feingold, Charles E. Schumer, and
RichardJ. Durbin. S. REP. No. 109-295, at 55.
64

Id.

65

Id. at 54.
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suggests that the writing of the Report was at least somewhat motivated by
partisan tensions and objectives.
Moreover, not all the Republican members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee signed on to the Report. Republican Senator Richard Michael DeWine of Ohio refused to do so, 66 highlighting that even the Republican Committee members could not agree upon a narrower Section
5 retrogression standard. With only nine signatures, the SenateJudiciary
Committee
was • not 67signed by a majority of the full nineteen
membes
ofReport
he
members of the Committee.
Finally, the Senate Judiciary Committee
issued the report after the fact, following the passage of the House version of the reauthorization bill, further suggesting that the report should
be accorded little, if any, weight by courts.
II.

CONSEQUENCES OF ADOPTING THE POST-PASSAGE SENATEJUDICIARY
COMMITTEE REPORT'S NARROW INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 5:
RISKING REINSTATEMENT OF ASHCROy"S DEFERENTIAL STANDARD

Before analyzing the deference owed to the Senate Report, this
Comment will examine how the Report's narrowing language changes
Section 5's retrogression standard. Only by first understanding what retrogression standard the reauthorized Section 5 established in overturning Ashcroft and which "naturally occurring majority-minority districts"
Section 5 covers can the significance of the Senate Report's interpretation of Section 5 be determined.
A. "Ability to Elect" Absent the SenateJudiciary Committee Report
Although the reauthorized Voting Rights Act reinstates the retrogression standard articulated by the Supreme. Court in Beer,e6 it is unclear
what types of districts the Beer standard established. Post-Beer, the Supreme Court appeared to focus on preserving majority-minority districts,
leaving open the question of which other districts are covered under
Beds retrogression standard. In contrast, the Ashcroft Court identified for
66 See Stem, supra note 15 (noting that Senator Mike DeWine
of Ohio, whose spokesperson noted that the Senator "did not think the committee report was indicated in this
case," was "the sole Republican who did not sign the report").
67 See 152 CONG. REc. S8372 (daily ed.July 27, 2006)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting
that "only nine Republican members of the committee, less than a majority, endorsed the
report").
68 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (upholding
a redistricting scheme
that preserved the number of majority-minority districts); see aLso Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch.
Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 335 (2000) (finding no retrogression where no majority-minority districts
existed under the benchmark plan).
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the first time which types of districts satisfy Section 5 preclearance. The
broad non-retrogression standard Ashcroft adopted permitted jurisdictions to replace majority-minority districts-districts in which minorities
constituted more than fifty percent of the population-with influence or
coalition districts69 -districts

in which minorities may constitute as little

as twenty-five percent of the voting age population-without violating
Section 5.70 Neither before Ashcroft nor in Ashcroft itself has the Court
ever established whether it interprets Section 5 as focusing only upon the
relative number of majority-minority districts before and after the proposed voting or redistricting change.
Michael A. Carvin, Former Deputy Assistant General to the Department ofJustice's Civil Rights Division, and Professor Nathaniel Persily of
the University of Pennsylvania both testified in hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the difficulty of determining the
scope of Beds retrogression standard.7 ' Both agreed that Section 5's
"ability to elect" language covers more than majority-minority districts
and other districts with a "magic number" percentage of minorities relative to the overall population. 71 Such a formulation ignores the numerous factors affecting minorities' "ability to elect" in each jurisdiction. 3
Instead, "ability to elect" and the effects of redistricting "will depend on
74
the political characteristics of the area in which the district is drawn."
Under this more nuanced understanding of "ability to elect," Section 5
should protect not only majority-minority districts, but also "control" dis-

69 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text
(defining influence and coalition districts, and explaining criticisms of these concepts).
70 Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S.
461,487-88 (2003).
71 See Renewing the Temporary Pmvirions of the Voting Rights Act:
Legislative Options after
LULAC v. Perry: Hearingon S.2703 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Prperty Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,109th Cong. 136-43 (2006) [hereinafter Legislative Options Hearing] (statement of Michael A. Carvin, Partner, Jones Day); Benefits and Costs
Hearing supra note 50, at 198-203 (statement of Nathaniel Persily, Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Pennsylvania).
72 Benefits and Costs Hearing,supra note 50, at 201
(statement of Nathaniel Persily, Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Pennsylvania); see also Legislative Options
Hearing,supra note 71, at 10-11 (statement of Michael A. Carvin, Partner, Jones Day) (explaining that in "districts where minorities are not sufficiently large that they constitute a
majority in a district but they are, nonetheless, sizable enough that they can form a coalition
with non-minority votes," minorities are still able to elect their candidates of choice and
therefore these districts are covered by the VRARA's "ability to elect" language).
73 See Benefits and Costs Hearing,supranote 71, at 201-02 (statement of
Nathaniel Persily,
Professor of Law and Politics, University of Pennsylvania) ("[T]he effect of redrawing lines
on minorities' ability to elect will vary across space, time and groups.").
74 Id. at 202.
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tricts 75 -- districts in which minorities retain political control because they

can form a "winning coalition" with non-minority voters. 76 Jurisdictions
under this formulation will be deemed to retrogress and violate Section 5
if they replace either majority-minority or control districts with influence
or coalition districts.77
The House Report affirms this interpretation of "ability to elect" by
explaining that Congress intended to focus Section 5 on a minority
group's ability to "control the outcome of an election." 78 In rejecting
Ashcroft, the House Report described the definitions of influence or coalition districts as being unmanageable standards that fall short of guaranteeing that minority groups' electoral power has not been diminished.79
Nor was the House Report the only indication that Congress as a whole
shared this concern. Both Representative Sensenbrenner,8° the sponsor
of the House bill, and the Senate Judiciary Committee, which issued the
controversial post-passage report, condemned influence and coalition
districts as falling to ensure that minorities retain their ability to elect
their candidates of choice."'
Although Section 5 clearly covers "cracking"-breaking up concentrated minorities into a larger number of districts (such as replacing ma812
jority-minority districts with influence or coalition districts )-what is less
evident is whether Section 5 protects against "packing," which involves
placing minorities in a smaller number of districts in which they make up

75 Id. at 200.
76 Legislative Options Hearing supra note 50, at 139 (statement of Michael A.
Carvin,

Partner, Jones Day).
77 Id.; Benefits and Costs Hearing supranote 50, at 200-02
(statement of Nathaniel Persily,
Professor of Law and Politics, University of Pennsylvania). It is less clear whether Section 5
protects a control district from being replaced by a coalition district, as even the Senate Report's conflicting legislative documents have not specifically addressed this point.
78 H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 70 (2006)
(Conf. Rep.).
79 Id.
80 See 152 CONG. REc. H5143 (daily ed. July 13, 2006) (statement
of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("[T]he purpose of the preclearance
requirement is to protect the ability of minority citizens to elect their preferred candidates
of choice.").
81 SeeS. REP. No. 109-295, at 19 (2006) (Conf. Rep.) (disapproving
of the Court's use of
"vague concepts such as influence, coalition, and opportunity").
Id. Even with "cracking," Section 5 coverage may depend on the degree to which a
proposed redistricting plan "cracks" the minority community. For example, a proposed
plan that splits a minority group comprising fifty percent of the population under the
benchmark plan into two districts in which the group makes up only forty-five percent in
the original district is probably less likely to be denied preclearance as retrogressive than a
plan in which the minority group after redistricting comprises only thirty percent of the
population in that district.
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a greater percentage of the population.
Professor Persily's testimony
argues that "packing" presently poses a greater risk to minority electoral
power than "cracking," because "packing" allows for significant partisan
maneuvering and district line manipulation."' By reducing minorities'
influence to a smaller number of districts, jurisdictions dilute minorities'
ability to affect the political process and elect their candidates of choice. 85
Although the "plain language" of the reauthorized Section 5 never
explains whether both "cracking" and "packing" are retrogressive, legislative history indicates that Congress intended to bar both redistricting tactics. First, Section 5 prohibits any voting-related change that "diminishes"
a minority group's "ability... to elect.",86 Strikingly, it does not contain
an accompanying narrowing definition that limits retrogression to "cracking."
Moreover, in disapproving of Ashcroft, the House Report explicitly
frowns upon allowing states to make "trade-offs," where the changes are
in reality "nothing more than a guise for diluting minority voting
strength. 's The House Report explains that by being highly deferential
to covered jurisdictions, Ashcroft's understanding of Section 5 makes federal scrutiny "a wasteful formality. '' 8 If Congress is primarily worried
about any attempt to thwart minority electoral power, as the House Report indicates, then Section 5 must protect majority-minority districts and
minority "control" districts against both "packing" and "cracking," given
that "packing" potentially poses a greater threat to minority voting
strength than "cracking" and that the VRARA provides no limiting language contradicting this understanding. Thus, absent the Senate Report,
Section 5's "ability to elect" standard not only protects majority-minority
and minority control districts from being replaced by influence or coalition districts that dilute minority voting strength through "cracking," but
83

See Benefits and Costs Hearing,supra note 71 (statement of Nathaniel Persily, Professor

of Law and Politics, University of Pennsylvania) (describing packing as "the overconcentration of minorities among too few [districts]").
84 See id. ("Over the proposed 25 year tenure of [the] bill, packing
will likely pose a
greater risk to minority political opportunity than will cracking .... ").
85 See id. ("[A] jurisdiction might dilute the minority vote by splitting large minority
communities among several districts in which they really have no influence at all.").
86 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5(b), 120 Stat. 577,
580-81 (2006).
87 H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 70 (2006) (Conf. Rep.) (quoting
Voting Rights Act: The Judicial Evolution ofthe RetrogressionStandard: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
H. Comm. on theJudiciary,109th Cong. 50 [hereinafter VRA Hearings] (statement of Laughlin
McDonald, Director, ACLU Voting Rights Project)).
88 Id.
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also protects minorities from being "packed" into a smaller number of
districts.
B. "NaturallyOccurringMajority-MinorityDistricts"
Similar to the Beer retrogression standard, the Senate Report's assertion that minorities' "ability to elect" includes only "naturally occurring
majority-minority districts"s9 appears at first glance to be clouded with
ambiguity. Never before has any court used the words "naturally occurring majority-minority districts," 9° nor did the language appear in any of
the preceding versions of the Voting Rights Act. Prior to being included
in the Senate Report, the phrase "naturally occurring" appeared only in
Anne Lewis's testimony before the House of Representatives.
Lewis used the "naturally occurring" language only once in her testimony, describing enforcement of the original Voting Rights Act as
eliminating "the gerrymandering tool of refusing to draw naturally occurring geographically compact majority-minority districts., 92 Unlike the
Senate Report, Lewis never alleged that the amended Section 5 only covers and intends to protect such districts. Although the "naturally occurring" language can be traced to Lewis's testimony, it is still not clear how
the Senate Report arrived at its determination that Section 5 only covers
"naturally occurring" majority-minority districts.

89 S. REP. No. 109-295, at 21 (2006) (Conf.
Rep.). It is less clear whether coalition districts, which are not significantly discussed in either the House or Senate Report, also constitute "ability to elect" districts. Under the broader definition, coalition districts may also
qualify.
'J0 In past cases, the Supreme Court has only used the words "naturally occurring" in
two contexts. First, the Court has used the language to refer to reasonably expected interpretations of language. See, e.g., United States v.Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 502 (1911) (arguing
that the statutory language at issue would not "naturally occur" to a draftsman with a particular purpose). In the second group of cases, "naturally occurring" has referred to events
or organisms that occur without human interference. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't v. Am.
Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 651 n.57 (1980) (using "naturally occurring" to describe the relative concentration of benzene); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980) (describing bacteria existing in the wild as "naturally occurring"); Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917, 922 (1971) (describing earthquakes as "naturally
occurring" events). Neither use is applicable to understanding majority-minority districts,
and "naturally occurring" appears inapposite to a discussion of voting districts in general.
By definition, districts are artificially created by humans, so there can be no "naturally occurring" majority-minority districts.
91 VRA Hearings, supra note 87, at 30-37 (2006) (statement
of Anne Lewis, Attorney,
Strickland Brockington Lewis LLP).
92 Id. at 34.
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In narrowly interpreting Section 5's scope, the Senate Report effectively refutes the broader definition of "ability to elect" as covering all majority-minority districts as well as minority control districts, a definition
that is supported by the rest of the legislative history. 93 Neither the Report nor Lewis's testimony explains in detail what a "naturally occurring"
majority-minority district entails. The closest the Report comes is defining such districts as already having "a clear majority of minority voters. 94
Both Lewis's testimony and the Senate Report also describe "naturally
occurring" majority-minority districts as differentiable from the redistricting schemes
declared unconstitutional in the Shaw v. Reno line of
96
cases.
In these cases, the Supreme Court invalidated partisan gerrymandering schemes in which districting was predominantly motivated by
race, as evidenced by district lines so bizarrely drawn that they could not
bejustified by any legitimate concern.
Thus, it appears that the "naturally occurring" majority-minority district, as defined and employed by the Senate Report, covers all majorityminority districts that do not appear to violate Shaw's prohibition on racedriven gerrymandering. So long as a given redistricting scheme's district
boundaries can be justified by a legitimate redistricting concern and do
not seem so bizarrely shaped as to implicate overriding racial concerns,
the majority-minority districts the plan creates should be considered
"naturally occurring."
Specifically, the Senate Report disapproves of the "increased substitution of partisan interests" through the Democratic Party's gerrymanders,
such as the replacement in Ashcrofl of Georgia's majority-minority districts
with influence and coalition districts. 97 Elsewhere, the Report avers that
Section 5 intends to bar the "cracking or fragmenting [of] geographically
compact minority voting communities. ' 98 By articulating such concerns
narrowly, the report appears to exclude "packing" from the retrogression
definition. This means that covered jurisdictions would be free to con-

See supraPart 11.A
S. REP. No. 105-295, at 15.
95 509 U.S. 630 (1993); see also Miller v.Johnson,
515 U.S. 900, 915-17 (1995) (explaining the Shaw standard).
96 See VRA Hearings,supra note 87, at 34 (statement of Anne Lewis,
Attorney, Strickland
Brockington Lewis LLP) (differentiating "naturally occurring" majority-minority districts
from "more cartographically obvious methods" which politically gerrymander to create
bizarrely shaped districts such as those struck down in Shaw); S. REP. NO. 105-295, at 20 (explaining the Committee's concern that jurisdictions can use Section 5 to meet partisan interests through gerrymandering).
97 S. REP. No. 105-295,
at 20.
98 Id. at 19 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
93
94
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centrate minority groups into a smaller number of districts for partisan
purposes, even though this concentration defeats Section 5's broad aim
of protecting minorities' "ability to elect" their candidates of choice.99
Thus, if accorded authoritative interpretive weight, the Senate Judiciary Committee's report would narrow Section 5's scope to apply only to a
subset of majority-minority districts, rather than to all majority-minority
districts and minority control districts, while also excluding "packing"
from the definition of retrogression barred by Section 5. By effectively
restricting the federal government's enforcement powers, the Senate Report's understanding of Section 5 resembles Ashcrofts deferential approach to retrogression, the very standard struck down by the reauthorized Section 5.
III.

DETERMINING WHAT TYPE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY THE
APPENDED COMMITTEE REPORT SHOULD CONSTITUTE

Where a statute's "language is plain and admits no more than one
meaning" of congressional intent, courts will not' °° or are very reluctant101 to consult legislative history-the statute's internal pre-history of
"institutional progress.., and the deliberation accompanying that progress."' 102 However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly departed from this
"plain meaning rule" by using legislative history to confirm its statutory
interpretations. 0 3 It is "the nearly universal view among federal judges"
that their "primary responsibility, within constitutional limits, [is] to subordinate [their] wishes to the will of Congress because the legislators' col-

99 See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271-72 (2004) (describing a Republican-led

redistricting plan in Pennsylvania that concentrated minorities into a smaller number of
majority-minority districts, thereby resulting in a higher number of Republican legislators).
Here, the narrow interpretation of Section 5 appears to be a tactic driven by partisan interests.
100Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
101See BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 187 n.8 (2004) (observing
"longstanding precedents that permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret
ambi uous statutory text").
2 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 937 (3d ed. 2001); see also OrrO HETZEL, MICHAEL
LIBONATI & ROBERT WILLIAMS, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 438 (2d ed. 1993) (providing a checklist of "legislative history" materials ranging from committee hearing transcripts
to recorded votes).
103 See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper. The Use of Legislative History in
Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 288-89
(1990) (showing that in the 1988-1989 term, the Supreme Court was "not running wild in
its use of legislative history," rarely using it to contradict its own legislative understanding).
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lective intention.., trumps the will of the court."'' 1 4 Thus, where the text
appears ambiguous or is susceptible to more than one interpretation,
courts often consult congressional materials to derive legislative intent.
The amount of deference due to such legislative materials depends
on their type and nature. There is a generally recognized hierarchy of
congressional sources that designates which sources are most authoritative. 10 5 Courts attribute more interpretive significance to committee reports and statements by a bill's primary sponsor than they do to statements by other individual legislators, floor debates, and postenactment
history. 106
Given that legislative history is inherently interpretive, however, being
made up of numerous materials that may contradict one another, and
that looking to legislative history necessarily considers materials not voted
upon by the entire Congress, 1 7 there is no clear, correct doctrinal answer
that categorically predetermines which sources will be considered significant and which will be discarded. Since "consistent and uniform rules for
statutory construction... are not being followed today," Judge Patricia
M. Wald has described using legislative analysis as "akin to looking over a
crowd and picking out your friends. ' It is particularly for this reason
that new textualists such as Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank H.
Easterbrook oppose the use of legislative history, considering these materials unauthoritative.l°9 Rather, they see Congress as having a "voice as a

Id. at 281; see also
Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 491 U.S. 440, 453 n.9 (1989)
("[I]t [does not] strike us as in any way 'unhealthy' or undemocratic to use all available materials in ascertaining the intent of our elected representatives, rather than read their enactments as requiring what may seem a disturbingly unlikely result, provided only that the
result is not 'absurd."' (citations omitted)).
105See George A- Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "BenignFictions"
The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990
DUKE LJ. 39, 4142 (providing the "rough hierarchy" of legislative materials beginning with
the most persuasive sources: committee reports, sponsor floor statements, floor manager
explanations, other statements by committee members, statements by noncommittee
members, and statements by bill opponents).
106 Id.
107 See Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J.
104

371, 375 ("The great flood of legislative history suggests that members of Congress can
scarcely be expected to master the secondary materials of the bills upon which they vote.").
108 Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative
History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 lowA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 723
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(refusing to condone the majority's reliance on legislative history because the Court's "obligation is to go as far in achieving the general congressional purpose as the text of the statute fairly prescribes-and no further"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, Histoy, and Structure in
Statutory Interpretation,17 HARv.J.L. & PUB.POL'y 61, 68-69 (1994) ("[T]he only way the leg-
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constitutional player only through its finally enacted statutes, not through
any supplementary explanation thereof."'110
Despite such reservations and at least three justices who espouse new
textualism,"I the Supreme Court continues to consider legislative history
relevant to interpreting ambiguous statutory language.1 2 Given that the
VRARA fails to articulate a clear retrogression standard for Section 5, providing only that covered jurisdictions must not diminish a minority
group's ability "to elect their preferred candidates of choice" and that
Congress disapproves of Ashcroft, 1 3 courts interpreting this legislation will
likely consider legislative history.
The remaining question is whether the Senate Judiciary Committee
Report in particular should and will be an authoritative legislative source
used to constrict the scope of Section 5's preclearance mechanism. Since
the Senate committee charged with overseeing the bill's consideration
and passage issued the Report, but only after both houses of Congress
had already voted for the bill, the Report could be characterized as either
a committee report or postenactment legislation. This characterization
will determine in part how significant or controlling the report should
and will be in construing Section 5's retrogression standard.
A. Characterizingthe Report as a Typical Committee Report
Entitled to SignificantDeference
Ordinarily, a report prepared by the Senate Judiciary Committee, the
committee overseeing the passage and consideration of the VRARA,
would be entitled significant weight as legislative history.1 4 Despite the

islature issues binding commands is to embed them in a law." (emphasis omitted)); Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to AdministrativeInterpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J 511, 515
(arguing that thejudiciary ought not to look to legislative history in interpreting statutes).
110 Wald, supra note 103, at 285.
See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 102, at 956 (remarking thatJustice Scalia's new textualist approach is usuallyjoined byJustice Thomas, and sometimes byJustice Kennedy).
112 SeeJane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation: Implicationsfor the Legislative History Debateand Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REv.
1, 14 (1998) (showing that the Rehnquist Supreme Court's use of legislative history increased in the mid-1990s, which "suggest[s] that the textualists' challenge to 'intent' as an
anchoring concept has yet to succeed").
"3 See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott
King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5(b), 120 Stat. 577, 578-80
(2006).
114 See EsKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 102, at 947 ("Mostjudges and
scholars agree that...
a statement in a committee report will usually count more than a statement by a single legislator.") ;John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine,97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 674
(1997) ("[T]he Court has routinely treated the declarations of intent found in committee
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considerable interpretative debates over whether to accord legislative history any weight at all,' committee reports are widely considered to be
more reliable and therefore more persuasive than any other type of legislative history. 11 6 As opposed to statements by individual legislators, a
committee report constitutes a collective statement prepared by the subcommittee that is entrusted with overseeing the bill and therefore is most
knowledgeable about its intricacies.
By clearly summarizing the bill's aim and supporting findings and
then explaining the bill section by section, a committee report's structure
and format are especially conducive to determining legislative intent regarding specific provisions of an act.1 7 In fact, "committee reports are
more like judicial opinions than most documents that the legislative
process generates" because they offer "a deliberative rationale and argument for passage of the law.""" Moreover, Congress can be deemed to
have delegated "explanatory authority" to the overseeing committee
"with the implicit understanding that their exposition will influence
courts.""

9

Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has consistently cited and considered committee reports more than any other type of legislative history,
and very often more than all other sources of legislative history combined. 20 In numerous cases interpreting Section 5 of the VRA, the Supreme Court has cited committee reports to support its construction of
the provision. 121 Similarly, on its face, the 2006 Senate Judiciary Commit-

reports... as especially 'authoritative' evidence of the intent of Congress as a whole."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 374-75 (1990)
("[T]he committee report is an authoritative context for choosing among alternative meanings of the text").
115See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text (describing new textualists'
dismissal
of legislative materials as unauthoritative).
"6 See ESKRIDGE ETAL., supra note 102, at 947 (noting that committee reports are generally accorded more weight than other legislative materials); Wald, supra note 103, at 306
("[L]egislative history is the authoritative product of the institutional work of the Congress."); see also Costello, supra note 105, at 41 (placing committee reports at the top of the
hierarchy of possible legislative history sources).
117 Costello, supra note 105, at 41.
118 Schacter, supra note 112, at 43
(emphasis omitted).
119 Manning, supra note 114, at 694.
20 SeeJorge Carro & Andrew Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative
Histores: A StatisticalAnalysis, 22JURtMETRIcsJ. 294, 304 tbl.2 (1982) (showing that committee
reports alone comprised over forty-five percent of all
legislative history references from 1938
to 1979); Schacter, supra note 112, at 15 (finding that "by far the leading source consulted is
the congressional committee report").
121 See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1997) (treating
language from the Senate report accompanying the 1975 reauthorization of Section 5 "at the very least as an equi-
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tee Report's narrow construction of minorities' "ability to elect" could be
considered relevant, if not authoritative, legislative history.
Nonetheless, committee reports are neither categorically entitled to
nor universally accorded significant deference, especially where they ap122
pear suspicious as planned colloquies -politically strategic maneuvers
by individual or groups of legislators to "smuggle in" helpful lobbyist language without the consent of other members of Congress.'12 Because the
members of the subcommittee overseeing the legislation prepare these
reports alone, their findings and characterizations of the bill have not
been scrutinized or approved by Congress as a whole, raising doubt as to
whether these documents accurately reflect the congressional understanding of the bill. In response to these concerns, state courts, while still
admitting committee bill reports as indicia of legislative intent, typically
accord them little weight, presuming instead
that they are unpersuasive
4
representations of congressional intent.11
In light of such bootstrapping suspicions, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report's appended, post-passage, and particularly controversial
nature significantly curtails its persuasiveness. Released after the House
already passed its version of the bill that would become law when signed
by President Bush, the Senate Report can be seen as an end-of-the-game
strategic move by individual members of the Judiciary Committee to
smuggle in constricting language to significantly limit Section 5's preclearance provision. 25 The Report is particularly troubling because it is
inconsistent both with the House Judiciary Committee's report on the
House version of the bill, 1' 6 as well as with the dissenting Senate Judiciary
table factor to take into account, if not as a statutory mandate"); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452
U.S. 130, 147-52 (1981) (explaining in detail how the Senate Report from Section 5's reauthorization in 1975 confirms the Court's understanding of preclearance); City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 169, 199-200 (1980) (explaining that the Court is bound by the
"unambiguous congressional intent" articulated in both the House and Senate majority
committee reports); Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 46 (1978) (finding the committee reports accompanying Section 5's reauthorization in 1975 to be of particular relevance).
122 William S. Moorhead, A Congressman Looks at the Planned Colloquy
and Its Effect on the
Interpretationof Statutes 45 A.BAJ.1314, 1314 (1959).
12 See Hirschey v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777
F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that it is unreasonable to assume that a committee report
"come[s] to the attention of, much less [is] approved by, the house" enacting the bill).
14 ESKRIDGE ETAL., supra note
102, at 964.
15 This precise charge has been made by the dissenting Democratic members of the
committee. See supranotes 63-65 and accompanying text.
16 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (explaining
how the House Report
strikingly omits and to some degree conflicts with the Senate Report's narrow understanding of Section 5).
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Committee Democratic members' understanding of the legislation.12 7 In
effect, there are dueling committee reports offering conflicting understandings of Section 5. Strikingly, the Senate Report differs from all past
Supreme Court cases citing to the VRA because all of these cases had coinciding Senate and House Reports, or at least did not have dueling understandings.18 Especially given its post-passage nature, the Senate Judiciary Report cannot be accorded significant weight simply because it is a
committee report. Rather, its level of persuasiveness rests on who is considered to best constitute "Congress" and, thus, whether the report is the
best measure of legislative intent."9
B. Viewing the Report as Akin to Postenactment Legislation
Accorded Little to No Deference
The Senate Judiciary Committee's July 26, 2006 Report could also be
characterized as a form of postenactment legislation, given that it reports
on the substantially identical Senate version of the House reauthorization
bill that had already been passed by both houses of Congress. 130 Unlike
committee reports, which are generally accorded significant weight,
"post-enactment pronouncements are ordinarily not dispositive regarding congressional intent," according to the Supreme Court's repeated assertions.13 1 Unsurprisingly, this reluctance is particularly pronounced
among new textualists, such as Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin
Scalia, who already doubt whether legislative history such as committee
reports, which are generally acknowledged to be worthy of significant
consideration,32 should weigh upon a Court's determination of congressional intent.
127 See supranotes 17, 63-65, and accompanying text (describing
the Democratic Senate
Judiciary Committee members' vehement dissent from the Report and contrary understanding of Section 5).
128 See cases cited supra note 121.
19 See infra Part IV (analyzing the report's
persuasiveness according to different understandings of what best embodies "Congress").
130 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying
text.
131 See, e.g., United Ass'n ofJourneymen v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1134, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,520 (1992)); see also Cobell v. Norton,
428 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[P]ost-enactment legislative history is not only oxymoronic but inherently entitled to little weight.").
132 See, e.g.,
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 935-36 (1994) (Thomas, J.,concurring) (accusing the majority of "abandoning proper methods of statutory construction" by interpreting and applying any legislative history aside from acts of Congress); Sullivan v. Finkelstein,
496 U.S. 617, 631-32 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing postenactment history
"of a statute's consideration and enactment" as a "contradiction in terms," which "should
not be taken seriously, not even in a footnote").
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Postenactment legislative history, in actively interpreting already considered congressional legislation through the eyes of members of a later
Congress, inherently runs the risk of representing only the "legislative future" of a bill.133 Courts are thus presumptively suspicious of legislative
history that may well unilaterally append a new statutory interpretation
that had never been considered by, and may significantly depart from,
the intended interpretation of the Congress that passed the bill.
Similarly, the appended Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the already passed VRARA bill should also be treated with suspicion. Even though the Report is technically preenactment, the Senate
Judiciary Committee issued it only after both the House and Senate had
already considered and passed the bill, and one day before the President
signed the virtually identical House version of the bill. Thus, the Report
is, in practice, just as problematic as postenactment legislation: it had
been appended after Congress already considered the legislation, without even providing Congress as a whole an opportunity to read it.
Despite what appears to be a general distrust of appended legislative
history, particularly postenactment legislation, the Senate Judiciary
Committee Report may still be entitled to weight given the limited types
of postenactment legislative history that have been addressed in previous
cases by the Supreme Court and the various federal courts of appeals.
Existing postenactment legislation case law falls into two main categories,
covering (1) statements of individual legislators from the same Congress
that passed the initial bill, and (2) remarks and reports made by subsequent Congresses that did not pass or amend the legislation. I will now
analyze the Senate Report accompanying the VRARA in light of each of
these bodies of case law.
1. Case Law for Same-Congress Individual Legislator Statements
In the few cases involving postenactment statements by individual
members of the same Congress that passed the legislation, courts have
repeatedly refused to accord these statements any weight. 3 4 As it is,

133 Gen. Instrument Corp. v. FCC, 213 F.3d 724, 733 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
134 See, e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 295 n.9 (1992)
(refusing to consider a Senator's postenactment amicus brief discussing various proposals which Congress considered
but failed to enact); Nat'l Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 462 U.S.
810, 832 n.28 (1983) (explaining that an individual statement unilaterally appended to an
already considered Senate conference does not deserve the same weight as a published conference report); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 117-19
(1980) (refusing to consider even the remarks of the legislator-sponsor from a subsequent
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courts usually disregard individual legislator statements as representing
only the "personal and anecdotal experience of someone in the legislative process,"''3 5 as opposed to the collective understanding of Congress as
a whole. 136 Courts find even less reason to allow postenactment statements by individual legislators to control the interpretation of ambiguous
portions of a statute. Rather, such
statements are considered to be "too
137
late to have any [desired] effect."
Courts even refuse to consider statements made by the bill's sponsor,
who is generally accorded greater deference due to her particular expertise and understanding of the bill. For example, in Fogg v. Ashcroft, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to give an introductory statement of the bill's sponsor any "material weight" because it was
made after the bill had been voted upon earlier in the day. 138 In fact, a
note in the Congressional Record explains that the portions of the
speech the bill's sponsor sought to introduce139had been "inserted or appended, rather than spoken.., on the floor."
This case law is particularly relevant to the section of the Senate Report in which Republican Senators Cornyn and Coburn argued that Congress, strapped for time and under significant political pressure, failed to
adequately consider alternatives to Section 5.140 Although the Senate Report included these remarks, it did so only under the heading of "Additional Views of Mr. Cornyn and Mr. Coburn, " 14' explicitly representing
only two senators' viewpoints. Stating that the final report was a "very different document from the draft Report circulated by the Chairman," the
Senate Democrats vehemently disagreed with Senators Cornyn and

Congress); Gen. Instrument Corp., 213 F.3d at 733 (refusing to consider a postenactment letter from the amendment's sponsor).
135 United Ass'n ofJourneymen, 73 F.3d at 1139 n.4 (quoting the Department ofJustice's
response to the plaintiffs attempt to introduce individual legislator remarks as persuasive
legislative history).
36 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979) ("The
remarks of a single legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing legislative history."); see also Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 209 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that weight
should be accorded to legislative history here, in departure from previous precedent, because the record indicates that there was "no effort here to 'bootstrap"'), superseded by statute
on other grounds, 16 U.S.C. 1536(h) (2000); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)
(refusing to consider subsequent congressional materials because they form a "hazardous
basis" for properly inferring intent).
37 Foggv. Ashcroft, 254 F.3d 103,
108 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
138 Id. at
108-09.
139 Id. at 109 (quoting 137
CONG. REc. 30,506 (1991)).
140 S. REP. No. 109-295, at 25-36 (2006) (Conf.
Rep.).
141 Id. at
25.

2007]

UNLIKELY "LEGISLATIVE HISTORY"

Coburn's characterization of the legislative process. 42 The Democratic
senators contended that neither the Republican Senate Judiciary Committee members nor any other senators mentioned the Senate Report's
concerns on the floor during consideration of the bill, and that this assessment did not "reflect [their] views or those of scores of other cospon'14
sors." 3

Moreover, Representative Sensenbrenner, the sponsor of the

House version of the bill that was ultimately signed into law, directly
countered the portrayal of the legislative process by Senators Cornyn and
Coburn. Representative Sensenbrenner lauded Congress for engaging in
"one of the most extensive considerations of any piece of legislation" that
44
he had seen in over twenty-seven years in Congress.1
Because the Democratic senators' dissent as well as Representative
Sensenbrenner's remarks reasonably raise the suspicion that Senators
Cornyn and Coburn, similar to the bill sponsor in Fogg,merely appended
remarks that cannot speak to "the premises on which the statute
passed" 45 in an attempt to smuggle in helpful language, this portion of
the Senate Report should not be accorded significant, if any, weight. In
fact, courts have only accorded weight to "Additional Views" of particular
legislators when they are deemed to be bill sponsors or proponents, 146
which neither of these senators even claims to be. There is further reason to discard Senator Cornyn's and Senator Coburn's statements: they
do not actually interpret the language of Section 5, or argue for a particular construction of Section 5's ambiguous retrogression standard. Instead, the remarks merely explain these individual senators' reflections
on the overall legislative process.
However, the postenactment case law involving same-Congress individual legislator statements is less controlling over the narrow interpretation of minority groups' "ability to elect" contained in both Senator Kyl's47
"Additional Views" in the Senate Report, and in the Report itself 1
Unlike the assessment of the legislative deliberation process provided by
Senators Cornyn and Coburn, both Senator Kyl and the Report's narrow142

Id. at 54.

143

Id.

144 152

CONG. REc. H5143 (daily ed.Jul 13, 2006) (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
145 Fogg v. Ashcroft, 254 F.3d 103,109 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
14 See, e.g., Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 783-85 (1985) (according weight to
the "Additional Views" of four legislators where one of them was the sponsor of the language in question); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 335 n.12 (1978)
(Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, .,concurring) (citing the "Additional Views of
Seven Representatives" because they were "proponents" of the legislation).
147 S.REP. No. 109-295, at 18-24 (2006) (Conf. Rep.).
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ing language addressed Section 5's specific language, making it directly
applicable to a judicial analysis of Section 5's ambiguous retrogression
standard. This definition of "ability to elect" also appeared in the main
body of the Senate Report, thereby representing the collective understanding of almost all of the Republican members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Since committee reports are considered to be more persuasive than individual member remarks,1 48 and because Senator Kyl's "Additional Views" directly coincide with the Report's statutory interpretation,
the case law regarding same-Congress individual legislator statements is
neither particularly helpful nor applicable. Instead, these sources appear
to necessitate greater judicial consideration than the remarks of Senators
Cornyn and Coburn. Nonetheless, the conflict between the Senate Report and Senator Kyl's narrow "ability to elect" standard on the one hand
and the House Report and Senate Democrats' refusal to constrict Section
5's language on the other still raises bootstrapping concerns, namely that
the Senate Report is a political document, rather than one reflecting collective congressional intent.
2. Case Law for Subsequent Congressional History
The second body of case law dealing with postenactment legislation
involves pronouncements from subsequent Congresses not involved in
the initial passage of the bill. In such cases, the Supreme Court has almost universally rejected statements of individual legislators that run the
risk of misrepresenting congressional understandings of a statute. 49 In
comparison to turning to already-suspicious individual legislator statements from the same Congress, 15° " [i]t is far worse" to rely on the opinions of "a few members of a later Congress." 15'

148
149

See supra notes 116, 120, and accompanying text.
See United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 33 n.9 (1980) ("[T]he views of some Con-

gressmen as to the construction of a statute adopted years before by another Congress have
very little, if any, significance." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Reg'l Rail Reorg. Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974) (arguing that such statements are entitled to little or no
weight); United Ass'n ofJourneymen v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1134,1139 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("It is
bad enough to interpret a statute on the basis of what a later Congress says about it. It is far
worse to rely on the views-not of a later Congress---but of a few members of a later Congress." (citation omitted)); Multnomah Legal Servs. Workers Union v. Legal Servs. Corp.,
936 F.2d 1547, 1555 (9th Cir. 1991) (refusing to allow "isolated committee remarks" to control the court's legislative interpretation).
1W See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text (explaining why
courts consistently
refuse to accord deference to individual legislators' statutory interpretations).
151United Ass'n ofJourneymen, 73 F.3d at
1139 n.4.
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Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to accord significant
weight to other legislative materials from subsequent Congresses, it has
also refrained from categorically rejecting such materials. In several
cases, the Court has cautioned against relying on subsequent legislative
history to divine an earlier Congress's intent,15' rejecting outright committee reports from subsequent Congresses.1 53 The Court's overarching
concern seems to be that such materials do not reflect or relate to what
the bill's legislators understood they were voting for, and thus do not 54affect the meanings accorded by the legislative body that passed the bill. 1
On the other hand, the courts have also suggested that there may be
instances in which it would be "remiss" to ignore such "authoritative expressions concerning the scope and purpose" of a statute,'55 especially
56
when there are several plausible interpretations of a statute's meaning1
or when the materials are being used to derive Congress's current policy
goals. 157 With the Senate Report, there is no concern that the SenateJudiciary Committee members were not part of the same institution (the
109th Congress) that considered the initial reauthorization bill. Although the Senate Report eliminates this different-institutions concern,
the Court's reluctance to consider even statements made by bills' original
sponsors'58 signals that it remains wary of any interpretations that have

152 See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 295 n.9 (1992) (expressing
"grave doubts" that legislation that subsequent Congresses considered but failed to enact is "of any value in construing [the legislation's] provisions"); United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170
(1968) ("[T]he views of one Congress as to the construction of a statute adopted many
years before by another Congress have very little, if any, significance." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) ("[T]he views ofa subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.").
153 See Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 628 n.8 (1990) (refusing
to accord weight
to a committee report from a subsequent Congress); South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367,
378 n.17 (1984) (rejecting the suggestion that committee reports accompanying subsequent legislation are entitled to any weight).
154 See, e.g., Sullivan, 496 U.S. at 631-32 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(refusing to accord any
interpretative weight whatsoever to postenactment legislative history, or even to endorse its
mention in a footnote).
155 Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677,686 n.7
(1979).
156 See, e.g., McCreary v. Offner, 172 F.3d 76, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
("[T]o determine
whether [a statute] is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning... post-enactment
legislative commentary offering a plausible interpretation is certainly relevant, much like
plausible interpretations from.., any other source would be.").
'1,7 SeeS. Cal. Edison Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 116 F.3d 507, 516 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) ("With respect to Congress's current policy goals, as distinguished from retrospective legislative history, we find the [subsequent] committee reports.., quite illuminating.").
158 See, e.g., Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 118-19
(1988) (refusing to
consider postenactment statements of a key sponsor which were not relied upon by legisla-
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not been explicitly considered or debated by the congressional body, not
to mention an interpretation that has met with vehement dissent from
other members of the Senate Judiciary Committee entrusted with considering the bill.
Given the dearth of relevant case law similarly involving a postpassage congressional committee report from the same Congress that
passed the bill, and the inability of the Senate Report to easily conform to
an existing type of legislative history material, it is unclear what weight, if
any, the Senate Report should be accorded. Instead, the Senate Report
should control Section 5's interpretation only if it accurately reflects
Congress's unexpressed intent, thus leading to another inquiry that is far
from clear.
IV. ANALYZING WHETHER THE COMMITTEE REPORT ACCURATELY
REPRESENTS THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 5
BY CONGRESS AS A WHOLE

Aside from the difficulty of determining whether the Senate Judiciary
Committee Report constitutes a timely, same-Congress committee report
entitled to significant weight or whether it is less significant, as postpassage legislation, the Report also conflicts with the Section 5 interpretations provided by the Democratic members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, the House bill's sponsor, and the House Judiciary Committee Report. Thus, in interpreting Section 5's retrogression standard, a
court would be faced with dueling committee reports, forcing it to decide
which understanding better represents congressional intent.
In two cases dealing with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)159
exemptions, the federal courts addressed this very problem. After the
Senate had already passed the bill, the House issued a committee report
construing an exemption provision more expansively than the Senate's
committee report. In Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia accorded more weight to
the House Report, viewing it as more in line with floor debates. 6 By contrast, in Department of the Air Force v. Rose, the Supreme Court interpreted

tors who enacted the law); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 117-18 (1980) (refusing to consider the remarks made by a subsequent Congress's legislative sponsor); Fogg v. Ashcroft, 254 F.3d 103, 108-09 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (refusing to consider sponsor remarks made later on the same day that the bill passed); Gen. Instrument
Corp. v. FCC, 213 F.3d 724, 733 (D.C. Or. 2000) (refusing to consider a postenactment letter from the amendment's sponsor).
1195 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
16 670 F.2d 1051, 1061 (1981).

2007]

UNLIKELY "LEGISLATIVE HISTORY"

the same provision according to the Senate report because it was more
consistent with judicial precedent and remaining legislative history that
construed that application of the provision narrowly. 161
These cases shed little light on the interpretive significance of the
Senate Judiciary Committee Report; after all, the Report was issued postpassage, not merely after the House had finalized its vote on the bill.
Moreover, the cases themselves arrived at different conclusions based on
the particular application of the FOIA exemption, thereby highlighting
how difficult it is to determine which of two dueling committee reports
should be accorded weight and how this entire inquiry rests upon which
committee report best represents Congress as a whole.
There are three different theories, each of which argues that the interpretation of a particular subsection or representative of Congress-be
it (a) the bill's sponsor, (b) the marginal congressional voter, or (c) the
statute itself--should control in light of conflicting understandings.
A. Congress Represented by the Sponsor of the Enacted Bill's Language
In resolving statutory ambiguity, the statements of the enacted bill's
main sponsor are often considered authoritative, decisive evidence of legislative intent. 16 As with committees, sponsors have taken
• •• the
163 lead in
framing the overall legislation and working out its intricacies.
Unsurprisingly, courts may see sponsor statements as "privileged,"16 presuming
that Congress, in delegating sponsors such authority, intends for statutory
ambiguities to be resolved by reference to their statements. 1 65 Thus,
courts should not "second-guess" Congress's intentional, chosen form of
organization. 166

161
162

425 U.S. 352, 371-72 (1976).
See, e.g., N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) ("Although the

statements of one legislator made during debate may not be controlling.... those of the
sponsor of the language ultimately enacted... are an authoritative guide to the statute's
construction." (citation omitted)); Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426
U.S. 1, 11-23 (1976) (using the statute's sponsor's statements, as well as committee reports
and amendment history, to determine legislative intent); Reynolds-Naughton v. Norwegian
Cruise Line Ltd., 386 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004) (arguing that the views of the sponsors of the
legislation's language are generally entitled to "special weight").
163 Manning, supra note 114, at 693-94 (explaining that Congress paints "with a broad
brush," delegating the "detail work" to sponsors and committees whose understandings
should be privileged by courts).
164 Id. at 694.
165 Id. at 694-95.
166 Id. at 694 (quoting Wald, supra note 103, at 307).
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The difficulty with the Senate Judiciary Committee's Report is that its
sponsor and the sponsor's accompanying interpretation of Section 5 are
not immediately apparent. Senator Specter was the official sponsor of
the Senate version of the bill. 67 As Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, he helped author the Committee Report and clearly adopted
the report's narrow construction of Section 5. If he is considered the
sponsor of the reauthorized Voting Rights Act legislation, the committee
report's interpretation of Section 5 should control under the sponsor
theory of Congress.
However, it is far from clear that Senator Specter was indeed the bill's
main sponsor. With all sponsor statements, there is the concern that they
do not represent the understanding held by the average congressional
voter. 68 This concern is reasonable given that individuals who are motivated to take the lead on particular types of legislation usually feel
strongly about which direction the legislation should take, and are therefore vulnerable to disproportionately reflecting the "most interested interest groups."' 69 With Senator Specter, this worry of congressional misrepresentation is particularly potent in light of the vigorous dissents from
Democratic members of the same Committee. 170 Moreover, because the
House of Representatives did not adopt a similarly narrow Section 5 understanding,"' it is even harder to argue that Senator Specter's interpretation controls both houses' statutory intent.
There is still the argument that the House, in not similarly construing
minorities' "ability to elect" as narrowly as the Senate, also failed to provide an alternate definition such that the two houses' understandings of
Section 5 do not conflict. However, since the courts have already articulated their reluctance to adopt postenactment sponsor interpretations
that do not accord with Congressional understandings, 7 2 Senator Specter's construction of Section 5 is unlikely to control.
Aside from his understanding not being clearly in line with Congress's collective intent, Senator Specter may not even be appropriately
considered the sponsor of the reauthorized Voting Rights Act. Unlike

167

S. REP. No. 109-295, at 1 (2006) (Conf. Rep.).

168
169

Manning, supra note 114, at 688.
Id.

170

See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (describing the dissenters' charges).

171

See supra Part II.A (explaining that absent the Senate Report, the House
never

adopted any narrowing understanding of Section 5 retrogression).
172 See,

e.g., Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 118-19 (1988) (refusing to

consider postenactment statements of the key sponsor authoritative where they were were
not relied upon by the legislators who enacted the law).
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with the House version of the bill, both houses of Congress never ultimately voted on and enacted the Senate bill into law. Representative
Sensenbrenner, who took the lead in authoring the bill's language, officially sponsored the House version of the bill. 7 ' Throughout his introductory, floor, and signing statements, as well as the House Judiciary
Committee Report, which he helped author as Committee Chairman,
Representative Sensenbrenner never indicated that Section 5 covers only
"naturally occurring majority-minority districts" or any other limiting lan174
guage.
Instead, he consistently reiterated that Section 5's retrogression
standard protects against efforts to "diminish the ability of minority
groups to elect the preferred candidates of their choice," implying a
broader construction of "ability to elect."'7 5 While Representative Sensenbrenner never explicitly specified that "ability to elect" should be
broadly defined to encompass more than "majority-minority districts,"
courts have articulated that in some
circumstances, the "silence of spon76
significant."
deemed
be
can
sors
Congress as a whole seems to consider Representative Sensenbrenner the bill's main and original sponsor, frequently lauding him for his
efforts to frame and advocate for the legislation. 77 Moreover, unlike
Senator Specter, whose understanding of the Committee Report was articulated post-passage, Representative Sensenbrenner's preenactment
remarks and report were timely, making his understanding appear more
credible and reliable. Since the House bill was never amended, it con-

See 152 CONG. REc. H5143 (daily ed.July 13, 2006) (statement of Rep. F.James Sensenbrenner, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("I was proud to lead Republican efforts to renew expiring provisions of the Voting Rights Act in 1982, and I am pleased to
have authored this important legislation to do the same thing a quarter century later.").
174 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 109-478 (2006) (Conf. Rep.)
(explaining the reauthorized
legislation without any mention of Section 5 covering only majority-minority districts); 152
CONG. REC. H5143-44 (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Chairman, H. Comm.
on the Judiciary) (laying out the Voting Rights Act when Representative Sensenbrenner
signed the legislation without any narrowing understanding of retrogression).
175 See H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 68-72 (presenting the
House Judiciary Committee's
construction of Section 5's retrogression standard without defining "ability to elect" as coveing only a "naturally occurring" or any other type of majority-minority district); 152
CONG. REC. H5143 (statement of Rep. F.James Sensenbrenner, Chairman, H. Comm. on
the judiciary) (signing the bill while explaining that the enacted House bill protects "the
ability of minority citizens to elect their preferred candidates of choice").
176 Costello, supra note 105, at 51.
177 See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S8372 (daily ed. July 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
173

(thanking Representative Sensenbrenner and others for working hard to assemble the record and to consider the House record); 152 CONG. REC. H5134 (statement of Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart) (commending Representative Sensenbrenner "for his determination and
his leadership and strength of character in moving forward [the] legislation").
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tains the same language and substance that it contained when Representative Sensenbrenner introduced it, thereby adding support to the argument that Congress had no intention of departing from his original interpretation of Section 5.' 78
The Democratic Senate Judiciary Committee members, in dissenting
from the Senate Report, also claimed that they were sponsors of the legislation."7 9 Although Senator Leahy, the ranking minority committee
member, made opening statements regarding the Senate bill, i18 none of
these senators was the official sponsor nor was involved in drafting the
legislation. Thus, it is unlikely that their interpretations would be considered controlling sponsor pronouncements.
Under the sponsor theory of congressional intent, although there are
other official or self-designated legislative sponsors, House Representative
Sensenbrenner appears to be the main sponsor of the reauthorized Voting Rights Act. Because his statements indicate that he believes Section 5
to encompass more than merely "naturally occurring majority minority
districts," it is unlikely that a court adopting the sponsor congressional
interpretation model would accord significant weight to the Senate Judiciary Committee's Report.
B. Congress as the Median CongressionalVoter
Rather than deferring to the statutory interpretations of bill sponsors
and the authors of the committee reports--likely supporters and advocates of the legislation-Congress may be better represented by the median voter, a hypothetical legislator whose policy preferences lie at the
exact center of Congress."" The median voter theory recognizes that
Congress is made up of not only supporters, but also individuals who disapprove of or are silent on the legislation until they vote. As Judge Frank
H. Easterbrook explains, under this model, "[i]t would be better to pop
the question to the median legislator, the one whose vote could change
the outcome.... To put it differently: If you put the question of intent

178

See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) (explaining that the

sponsor of the "language ultimately enacted" has a controlling understanding of legislative
intent).
179 S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 54 (2006) (Conf.
Rep.).
180 See 152 CONG. REC. S3987 (daily ed. May 3, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (introducing the bill to the full Congress).
1s1See generally ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIc THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (laying out the the logic behind the median voter theory with respect to candidates' policies
and elections); REBECCA B. MORTON, ANALYZING ELECTIONS 91-95 (2006) (same).
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82
Premised on
only to fervent supporters, the answer will not be useful."1
the notion that the statutory interpretation of the median legislator at the
fifty-first percentile would numerically control if legislators voted on
adopt, the thewhich from among a set of conflicting understandings to
8 3
ory finds the median voter's viewpoint to be controlling.

The Republican Party constituted the majority in both houses of the
109th Congress that passed the VRARA, making up approximately fiftythree and fifty-six percent of the House and Senate respectively. 184 If the
Senate Report embodies the Republican Party's-and thus each Republican representative's and senator's-understanding of Section 5, the Report's interpretation would control even if all the independent and Democratic legislators dissented.
However, there appears to be no clear consensus on the Report's
meaning even among Republican members of Congress. Although Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee authored and supported the Senate Report, not even all Republican Committee members
signed the Report. 85 Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee also headed and supported the House Report, which did not
adopt a similarly narrow construction of Section 5. Moreover, Republican Representative Sensenbrenner, who had been involved in authoring
the statutory language, was the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee whose interpretation departed from the Senate Report.18 6 Especially since neither the House nor the Senate ever voted upon the Senate
Report, nor openly discussed it on the floor, the Report does not clearly
represent the views of Republican legislators who were not members of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, let alone the Republican members of
Congress on the whole. Instead, the bill's unanimous passage in the Senate, its passage with a majority of the Republican representatives in the
House, and the rejection of all four House amendments, each with a majority of Republican representatives, signal that the Republican Party intended to adopt the language of the enacted statute that fails to mention
182 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Onginal Intent in Statutory
Construction, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 63 (1988).
183See Costello, supra note 105, at 62 (defining the median voter or "average Member"
as the legislator "who voted on... the measure without active involvement in sponsorship,
committee consideration, or opposition").
184 Specifically, Republicans held 231 of 437 House seats and
55 of 100 Senate seats.
MILDRED AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMBERSHIP OF THE 109TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE
2 (2006), availableat http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS22007.pdf.
185 See Stem, supra note 15 (describing Senator DeWine's refusal to sign the Report).
Notably, however, Senator DeWine was the only Republican not to sign. Id.
186See supranotes 174-175 and accompanying text.
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"naturally occurring" majority-minority districts. Since there is also no
evidence that the Senate Report's understanding of Section 5 represents
the majority of Congress as a whole, 187 regardless of political party, the
Report fails to represent congressional intent under the median voter
theory.
C. Congress Represented by Enacted Statutory Language
Critics of the sponsor and median voter theories of interpreting congressional intent, such as new textualists, fault these theories for departing from and underemphasizing the actual language of the legislation
passed by both houses of Congress. 1 8 Even if the language of the statute
is ambiguous, there is no guarantee that bill sponsors, who tend to overrepresent interest group understandings, adequately encapsulate congressional intent, or that the median voter theory properly represents
what Congress collectively understands the bill to mean. 89 In the case of
the VRARA, if Congress as a whole intended to adopt a narrow construction of "ability to elect" so that Section 5 covers only "naturally occurring
majority-minority districts," it ought to have included those specific words
in Section 5's text to reflect this understanding. This concern is especially valid given that the Senate Report's narrow construction was not
unanimously adopted by all Senate Judiciary Committee members, nor
was such language reflected in floor debates or the House Report that instead use the statute's broad "ability to elect" language."'
On the other hand, since other forms of legislative history do not explicitly provide an alternate understanding of Section 5 retrogression, the
Senate Judiciary Committee Report may not actually conflict with either
the statute's language or these other legislative materials, instead serving

187

As with the analysis of the Republican members' interpretation of Section 5, the

Senate Report does not appear to represent congressional intent because its narrowing language was never considered or voted upon by either the House or the Senate, nor does
such language appear in the final statute.
188 See supra note 109 (setting forth arguments that courts should
look only to statutory
text, rather than other legislative materials).
189 See supra notes 168-169 and accompanying text (explaining the setbacks of the
sponsor theory of congressional intent); see alsoCostello, supra note 105, at 61-63 (criticizing
the median voter theory for being a "fiction" that does not actually clarify either the statute
or the record, and risks resulting in "staged" colloquies between bill proponents that speak
little to Congress's collective intent).
190 See supra Part L.A (describing the broader retrogression standard established by
Section 5 absent the Senate Report's narrowing construction); supra note 174 and accompanying text (providing examples of Congress describing "ability to elect" without any narrowing
definition).
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merely to clarify the administrable standard for "ability to elect." Even
absent direct conflict, the language of Section 5 still fails to explicitly articulate such a narrow construction, meaning that the Report cannot be
considered under the new textualists' statute-only model of congressional
intent, nor is there any guarantee that the Senate Report accurately reflects the understanding of Congress as a whole.
CONCLUSION

The Senate Judiciary Committee issued a postpassage report that
risks narrowing Section 5's scope and enforcement powers. 9 Both this
Report and Senator Kyl's "Additional Views" argue that Section 5's retrogression standard covers only "naturally occurring majority-minority districts, M2 while Senators Cornyn and Coburn's "Additional Views" aver
that the time-pressured and politically charged Congress failed to adequately consider alternatives to the bill. 93 Under existing case law for
postenactment statements by individual legislators, courts should not interpret such "Additional Views" to represent the views of the collective
Congress that enacted the legislation. Because the Report cannot easily
be classified as embodying a timely committee report or postenactment
legislation, it is less clear whether its narrow "ability to elect" retrogression
standard should nonetheless be considered persuasive legislative hisT

tory.194

Under all three models of determining the statutory intent of Congress as a whole, the Senate Report does not conclusively appear to best
represent Congress's understanding of Section 5, especially given that it
departs from the House Report and Senate Judiciary Committee Democrats' statutory interpretations.
Instead, the Report should not be considered authoritative legislative history that is relevant to determining Section 5's scope.
Whether the Report will actually be considered in forthcoming cases
challenging the constitutionality of the reauthorized Section 5 is another,
more difficult question. Not only have courts-and even the Supreme
Court itself-been unable to apply the doctrine of statutory construc-

191

See supra Part I.D.

192 S. REP. No. 109-295, at 24 (2006) (Conf
Rep.).
193 Id. at 30-35.
194
95

See supraPart III.
See supra Part W.
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tion consistently,16 but the recent additions of Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court bench make
such predictions even more difficult.' 97 However, one theme that appears to run throughout the Court's previous legislative history case law is
a bootstrapping concern that makes the Court reluctant to accord weight
to any legislative material that appears to impose isolated legislators'
statutory interpretation over Congress's collective understanding.' 98 The
Senate Report met with vehement dissent, was not signed by a majority of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, was issued post-passage, and provides a
narrow Section 5 understanding that is not reflected anywhere else in the
record or the actual legislative text. If the Supreme Court continues to
abide by its bootstrapping concern, it is unlikely to accord the Senate Judiciary Committee Report any authoritative weight; nor should it.

196 Although Justices Scalia, Thomas, and sometimes Justice Kennedy
espouse new textualism, see supra note 111, the Supreme Court continues to rely on legislative history to
confirm its statutory interpretations. Wald, supra note 103, at 286-300. In fact, the number
of legislative history references has increased since Justice Breyer joined the Court. See
Schacter, supra note 112, at 10-36 (documenting an increase in legislative history references
beginning in the early 1990s).
197 A recent case suggests thatJustice Alito, unlike Justice Scalia, endorses
the use
of legislative history in statutory interpretation, although it is too soon to tell whether
Justice Alito, like Justice Breyer, will consistently rely on legislative history. See Posting
of Jason Mazzone to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com
(June 5, 2006, 16:10 EST) (detailing Justice Alito's reliance on legislative history to interpret the Speedy Trial Act in Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976 (2006), and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion criticizingJustice Alito's opinion).
198 See supra note 136 and accompanying text (explaining that courts
repeatedly accord
little authoritative weight to individual legislators' statutory interpretations).

